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ethics

Deceit in Defense
Investigations
rosecutors and police routinely employ
misrepresentation and deceit in undercover
investigations. In cases ranging from drug
distribution, prostitution, and sexual misconduct
with minors to organized crime and terrorism,
police and those cooperating with police deceive
suspects and their cohorts about their identities
and their intentions in order to gain information
to help uncover past crimes and thwart future
crimes. Frequently, such deceit helps reveal the
truth about what criminals do and think.
May defense lawyers and investigators working for them employ similar tactics? Or should
prosecutors be the only lawyers allowed to direct
and supervise investigatory deception? In recent
years, both debate and a divergence of views on
this question have emerged. In this column we examine that debate, the arguments raised on both
sides of it, and how various jurisdictions have answered this question.

The lawyer learns that the complainant has a
history of both false sexual allegations and accessing pornography on the Internet. The lawyer
strongly suspects the complainant rather than
the client accessed and placed the pornography
on the client’s computer. The lawyer wants to inspect the complainant’s home computer for similar pornography, which would help exculpate the
client by suggesting that the complainant rather
than the client was responsible for the pornography on the client’s computer. The lawyer fears
that to ask directly, though, will prompt the complainant to destroy any pornographic images on
the home computer.
The lawyer comes to you for advice. The lawyer
wants to hire a private investigator to gain access
to the complainant’s computer through deception.
The private investigator would pose as a computer consultant, contact the complainant’s family,
claim to be conducting a survey of computer use
by young people, and offer to swap the home computer for a new laptop computer that would purportedly allow the consultant to monitor the complainant’s computer use. The lawyer plans to have
an expert examine the computer for pornography.
Is the lawyer’s plan ethically permissible?

The Deceit Conundrum

The Model Rules
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Consider the following facts based on a recent
case. A lawyer’s client is charged with possessing
child pornography on the client’s work computer
and forcing a 12-year-old complainant to view
that pornography. The client and complainant
were acquainted through a mentoring program
and the complainant often spent time at the client’s place of work. The complainant knew the
client’s computer password and offered to show
the investigating officer the location of the pornographic images.
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A number of ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct bear upon the lawyer’s question about
the use of deceit in investigations. Some directly
address and categorically prohibit deceit. Others
impose vicarious responsibility on lawyers for the
acts of nonlawyers.
Deceit. Two key Model Rules directly address
deceit. One is Model Rule 4.1, which states that
“[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer
shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement
of fact or law to a third person . . . .” The other
is Model Rule 8.4, which provides that “[i]t is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (c)
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation . . . .”
Undercover investigations such as the one proposed by our lawyer in the pornography scenario
implicate both these provisions. Investigators going
“under cover” by definition make false statements
of fact to third persons that constitute misrepresentation and deceit. At the very least, such investigators deceive others about their identities and
purposes. The lawyer’s investigator, for example,
would falsely claim to be a computer consultant
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conducting a computer study in order to deceive the
complainant and the family. In order to establish
credibility in other contexts, investigators may make
false statements about such things as having a prior
criminal history and connections with criminals.
Vicarious Responsibility. Two other Model
Rules create vicarious ethical liability for lawyers
based on the acts of nonlawyers. Both rules apply
to conduct by a nonlawyer that is inconsistent with
the professional obligations of a lawyer. Model
Rule 5.3, entitled Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants, imposes both obligations and
responsibilities on lawyers “[w]ith respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with
a lawyer.” Section (b) requires a lawyer supervising
such a nonlawyer to “make reasonable efforts to
ensure” that the nonlawyer’s “conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.” Section (c) applies to conduct of a nonlawyer
that would violate the Model Rules “if engaged in
by a lawyer” and states that the lawyer “shall be
responsible” for conduct by a nonlawyer assistant
if the lawyer orders or ratifies the conduct.
The other rule creating vicarious ethical liability is Model Rule 8.4(a): “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another . . . .”
Attorneys, such as our lawyer, who employ
nonlawyers to conduct undercover investigations,
fall easily within both Rule 5.3(c) and 8.4(a). An
investigator hired by a defense lawyer is “employed, retained by, or associated with” the defense lawyer as required by Model Rule 5.3. And
such a lawyer knowingly assists and induces the
investigator, as required by Model Rule 8.4(a), by
providing information and payment.
The combined operation of Rules 4.1(a),
5.3(c), and 8.4(a) and (c) gives rise to the question
of whether the lawyer’s supervision of an investigation involving misrepresentation and deceit is
unethical. If one were to rely solely on the text of
these rules, there would be no question that our
lawyer’s supervision of investigatory deceit is unethical. The prohibitions on false statements and
deceit found in Model Rules 4.1(a) and 8.4(c) are
categorical. Neither rule states any exceptions,
whether for investigations or any other purpose.
Should these rules, though, be interpreted
more narrowly than they are written? Should
courts and ethics authorities through interpre-

tation create an exception allowing lawyers to
instigate and supervise investigatory deceit? Or
should Rule 4.1 or 8.4 be amended explicitly to
incorporate such an exception, either in the rule’s
language or a Comment to the rule? Jurisdictions
have answered yes to each of these questions.

The Arguments

A number of arguments can be advanced for allowing criminal defense lawyers to employ deceit
in covert investigations.
Utility. Legal and ethical prohibitions as well
as moral condemnation of deceit are based in
part on the harm deceit tends to cause both to
individuals and society. Unlike typical deception,
though, investigatory deception by police can be
useful in revealing truth and falsity. Misrepresentation and deceit by defense investigators is motivated by the same laudable goal as police deception of ultimately producing some greater truth
about guilt or innocence. In our fact scenario, for
example, evidence of the presence of pornography on the complainant’s computer would help
the jury determine the truth about the client’s
conduct and the complainant’s allegations. A
defense lawyer may want to employ deception in
other cases to uncover, prior to trial, misconduct
or untruthfulness of key witnesses to persuade
the prosecutor to consider dropping or amending
charges against the defendant or to impeach the
witnesses at trial.
Necessity. Investigatory deception, in addition
to being useful, is also often necessary in dealing
with crimes and criminals. Prosecutors and police
argue quite plausibly that they need to use deceit
to find the truth because criminal activity tends to
be clandestine. Crimes, by their very nature, tend
to be committed covertly since detection leads not
only to possible punishment but also social condemnation. In addition to having a motive to lie,
those who commit crimes are often seen as having
poor character relating to veracity, a view reflected
in our evidentiary rules regarding impeachment.
Also, many witnesses to crimes such as drug distribution and organized crime are likely to have a
powerful motivation to lie out of fear of implication or retaliation. Again, deception is often necessary to get such people to reveal the truth.
Defense counsel can make the same arguments. Like prosecutors and police, defense lawyers and their investigators must investigate clandestine activity and deal with people likely to lie.
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If anything, one might argue that the defense has
greater need than the prosecution for use of investigatory deception. The prosecution is able to
make deals with reluctant witnesses to encourage
them to come forward and tell the truth. Defense
counsel does not have this power.
Symmetry. The language of the bans on misrepresentation and deceit found in Model Rules
4.1(a) and 8.4(c) is unqualified. They apply to
prosecutors as well as defense lawyers and lawyers
in civil practice. Only Florida has amended its

yers to use deception inside the courtroom based
on the same rationales?

Amended Ethics Rules

A number of jurisdictions have modified their
ethics rules in ways that allow our lawyer to utilize investigative deception. States have used two
approaches to allowing such deception.
Supervising Covert Activity. Some jurisdictions
have adopted language explicitly permitting lawyers to supervise covert investigations. Oregon’s

If anything, it might be argued that defense has
greater need for the use of investigatory deception.
Rule 8.4(c) explicitly to permit government lawyers to supervise an undercover investigation. It
is well recognized, though, that prosecutors regularly supervise and advise police in the use of covert investigations employing misrepresentation
and deceit to investigate a wide range of crimes,
a tendency that both the “war on drugs” and the
“war on terror” have escalated. Despite the categorical ban on supervising and instigating investigatory deceit, prosecutors are not disciplined on
the basis of vicarious ethical responsibility for the
misrepresentations and deceit of the police and
informants they advise and supervise. If prosecutors are thus permitted to supervise investigatory
deceit, one can argue that simple fairness dictates
that defense lawyers be allowed to do the same.
Image of the Profession. One concern with approving of criminal defense lawyers advising and
supervising investigatory deception is that it will
have a negative impact on the image of the legal
profession and the criminal justice system. But, is
public response likely to be different to defense as
opposed to prosecutorial supervision of investigatory deceit? One can argue that if such deception helps reveal truth and decrease the number
of convictions of the innocent, the public response to such deceit might well be positive.
A Slippery Slope. Another argument against
allowing investigatory deception is that once lying is allowed, it will be hard to set and enforce
boundaries on it. If defense lawyers, for example,
are allowed to use deception in the investigatory
phase of a criminal case because it is useful and
necessary in revealing truth, why not allow law-

version of Rule 8.4 states “[i]t shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or
others about or to supervise lawful covert activity
in the investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights.” Ohio added a
Comment explaining that its Rule 8.4(c) “does
not prohibit a lawyer from supervising or advising about lawful covert activity in the investigation of criminal activity or violations of constitutional or civil rights when authorized by law.”
Wisconsin, in response to a case that inspired the
fact pattern featuring our lawyer at the outset of
this column, recently added a subsection (c) to its
Rule 4.1: “Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and
Rules 5.3(c)(1) and 8.4, a lawyer may advise or
supervise others with respect to lawful investigative activities.”
These jurisdictions authorize deceit only in the
context of investigations and only permit lawyers
to supervise or advise others, presumably nonlawyers, who engage in deceit. By negative implication, they appear to prohibit lawyers from personally engaging in misrepresentation or deceit
and supervising or advising others who engage in
deceit outside an investigative context.
Fitness to Practice Law. Virginia has taken a
different textual route in dealing with deceit in
investigations. It modified its version of 8.4(c)
by restricting its ban to dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation “which reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.”
This language is not as clear as the amendments
described in the previous section in permitting
the supervision of covert investigations. It is
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also broader, since its language appears to allow
the use of misrepresentation and deceit outside
the context of investigations and allows lawyers
themselves to engage in acts of misrepresentation and deceit, also known as “pretexting,” in
order to obtain exculpating, impeaching, or mitigating evidence or information.

Interpretation of Ethics Rules

As suggested previously, another way to allow
defense lawyers to use deceit in investigations under unamended versions of the Model Rules is
for courts and ethics authorities to interpret rules
such as Model Rules 4.1(a) and 8.4(c) more narrowly than they are written and create exceptions
allowing lawyers to instigate and supervise investigatory deceit. In doing so, courts and ethics authorities would be using an “intentionalist” method of textual interpretation and relying upon the
purposes and policies underlying the ethics rules
to create exceptions that override clear text.
This happened in Wisconsin prior to amendment of its version of Model Rule 4.1(a). A Wisconsin case, Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Hurley, 2008 Wisc. LEXIS 1181, dealt with discipline
of a lawyer who, in facts similar to those in our
introductory fact pattern, authorized an investigator to use deception to obtain the complaining witness’s computer. After doing so, a forensic computer expert found pornography on the
complainant’s computer as the lawyer suspected.
Soon after the deceptive investigation was revealed, though, disciplinary charges were brought
against the lawyer.
In Hurley, a referee assigned to make a report and recommendation in the case found the
lawyer’s use of investigatory deceit ethically appropriate. She also found that his conduct was
constitutionally mandated in order for him to
provide effective assistance of counsel. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court later adopted the
referee’s report.

Reasons for Caution

Despite the trend toward approval of defense use
of investigative deceit, defense lawyers need to be
cautious. The ethics rules of most jurisdictions still
set forth an unqualified ban on false statements and
deceit and it is uncertain how those rules will be interpreted. Even in jurisdictions that have explicitly
approved such deceit, there is ambiguity. Florida
has explicitly modified its version of Rule 8.4(c) to
allow government lawyers to supervise undercover
investigations. Does the fact that the rule mentions
only government lawyers mean that defense lawyers cannot supervise such investigations? New
York Ethics Opinion 737 (2007) approves limited
deceit in the investigation of “civil rights or intellectual property” cases, but is silent on criminal
cases. Also if defense lawyers choose to supervise
undercover investigations, they need to be careful
not to violate either the law or other ethics provisions, such as the anticontact rule, which prohibits
contact with a represented person.

Conclusion

We think the trend in favor of openly allowing
lawyers to supervise undercover investigations is
generally a positive one. In addition to the fairness of giving criminal defense lawyers the same
investigatory tools prosecutors use, it recognizes
that criminal defense lawyers often face the same
barriers to uncovering the truth as police and
prosecutors. In addition, we think that investigations such as the one done in the Hurley case not
only help uncover the truth, but are unlikely if
publicized, to generate a negative public reaction.
We would encourage courts and ethics authorities, though, to consider placing two limitations
on such investigations: (1) that the lawyer have a
reasonable basis for suspecting the investigative
deceit will uncover information important to the
case; and (2) that nondeceptive alternatives for
obtaining the information are either unavailable
or unlikely to be successful. n
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